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IN THE WAKE OF PATTERSON V. McLEAN CREDIT UNION: THE
TREACHEROUS AND SHIFTING SHOALS OF
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
Perhaps no circuit better exemplifies the current chaos that reigns
among the lower federal courts in the interpretation of Patterson v. Mc-
Lean Credit Union I than Colorado's Tenth Circuit. In the wike of Patter-
son, judges within the same Colorado district have issued contradictory
rulings on discriminatory firings,2 while another Colorado judge has
gone against the national grain by holding that retaliation may consti-
tute discrimination in the enforcement of an employment contract
within the protection of 42 U.S.C. section 1981.3
While the uncertainties left by these conflicting opinions may be
answered later this year by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals,4 there
still exists the unmeasurable consequences of those employment dis-
crimination cases that will never be brought.5 Concerns over the impact
of the Patterson decision and other recent Supreme Court rulings cutting
back the scope of employment discrimination protections have
prompted civil rights groups to call fori newlegislation. Currently, Sena-
tor Edward Kennedy and Representative Augustus Hawkins have intro-
duced and begun hearings on the Civil Rights Act of 1990,6 legislation
designed to negate Patterson and several other recent decisions involving
1. 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
2. It should be noted that the Tenth Circuit is not alone in its apparent lack of con-
sensus. In the Seventh Circuit, two judges, one day apart, took radically different positions
on whether employees fired in retaliation for complaints about racial discrimination ould
sue. See generally English v. General Dev. Corp., 717 F. Supp. 628 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (retalia-
tion claim allowed); Hall v. County of Cook, 719 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (retaliation
claim no longer actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1981). Prompted by this conflict, Richard
Posner, a judge for the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals and leader of the conservative
"law and economics" movement, expressed concern over what he deemed the "treacher-
ous and shifting shoals" of employment discrimination law since the Patterson decision. See
Malhotra v. Cotter & Co., 885 F.2d 1305, 1313 (7th Cir. 1989).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
4. Padilla v. United Airlines, 716 F. Supp. 485 (D. Colo. 1990), appeal docketed, No.
89-1246 (10th Cir. Aug. 9, 1989).
5. The chilling effect on lawsuits has been well documented by the NAACP Legal
Defense and Education Fund which conducted a study of cases decided since June 15,
1989, when the Patterson decision was announced. The study found that At least 158 claims
of intentional race discrimination have been dismissed in federal courts without any sub-
stantive ruling on the claims themselves. The dismissed cases included complaints of ra-
cial harassment on the job, failure to promote on the basis of race, and discriminatory
discharge. See Gordon, Last Hired, THE NATION, Jan. 29, 1990, at 113.
6. H.R. REP. No. 4000, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. 362 (1990) and S.
REP. No. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. 990 (1990). "The Supreme Court
has issued a series of rulings marking an abrupt departure in the Supreme Court's historic
vigilance in protecting civil rights," stated Senator Kennedy at a February 7, 1990, press
conference to announce the bill's introduction. "The Supreme Court has erected artificial
barriers for minorities and women. The Civil Rights Act of 1990 is intended to remove
these barriers and restore and strengthen basic rights for all Americans." The Kennedy
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employment discrimination. 7 Meanwhile, the Bush Administration has
introduced its own, more limited, civil rights legislation.8 While the ulti-
mate impact of the Patterson decision is being debated on the floors of
Congress, the expectations are starting to be realized as the fallout from
the rulings begins to reach the lower federal courts, such as Colorado's
Tenth Circuit.
II. PATTERSON V. McLEAN CREDIT UNION
In order to fully understand the quagmire within which the federal
district courts of the Tenth Circuit are currently embroiled, it is impor-
tant to understand the Supreme Court's decision in Patterson. In the
most closely watched civil rights case of the 1989 term, the Court was
faced with the plight of Brenda Patterson, a black woman who alleged
hostile and demeaning treatment by racist supervisors. Mrs. Patterson
claimed that from 1972 to 1982 she was harassed, denied promotion,
and eventually dismissed by her former employer, the McLean Credit
Union in Winston-Salem, North Carolina. She testified that the com-
pany president, who had hired her as a file clerk, warned her that she
would be working with white women who would not like her because she
was black. She alleged that he made her do menial chores not required
of white co-workers, gave her an oppressive workload, denied her merit
raises and promotion, and told her when she fell behind that "blacks are
known to work slower than whites by nature."9 The company, however,
denied that any discrimination took place.
Mrs. Patterson invoked the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which guaran-
tees to all persons the same right "to make and enforce contracts" as Cis
enjoyed by white citizens." 10 In its 1976 Runyon v. McCrary 11 decision,
the Court ruled that the 1866 law barred private parties from discrimi-
nating on grounds of race in determining with whom they would enter
into contracts, including employment contracts.
Specifically, in Runyon, the Court held that section 198112 was vio-
lated when a private school refused to admit a black child because of the
child's race. The Court held that section 1981 applied to making and
enforcing purely private contracts and that it was illegal for the school to
and Hawkins bills would appear to remedy the effect of the Patterson decision by clarifying
that § 1981 prohibits all racially-motivated employment discrimination.
7. For an excellent survey of the shifting directions taken last term by the conserva-
tive Reagan Supreme Court majority, see Holdeman, Civil Rights in Employment: The New
Generation, 67 DEN. U.L. Rv. 1 (1990).
8. H.R. REP. No. 4081, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REc. 426 (1990) and S.
REP. No. 2166, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REc. 1497 (1990).
9. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2392 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
10. Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
11. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982) provides: "All persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and
shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every
kind, and to no other."
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use race as a basis for refusal to contract with the parents of the child)13
The Runyon ruling was based on legislative and judicial history cited in
the 1968 case, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. 14
Originally, the Supreme Court agreed to review whether the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals had erred in dismissing Mrs. Patterson's racial
harassment claim on the ground that section 1981 bars employers from
discriminating only in hiring, firing and promotions.' 5 After hearing ar-
guments on that point in February 1988, the majority (Justices Rehn-
quist, Scalia, White, O'Connor and Kennedy), on April 25, 1988, raised
the stakes by questioning whether the post-Civil War Congress had in-
tended the law to cover racial discrimination in private transactions at
all.16
The reargument order transformed the case into a cause celabr. Civil
rights advocates organized a broad-based coalition of support. Numer-
ous amicus curiae briefs were submitted to the Court' 7 arguing that the
Runyon interpretation of section 1981 correctly expressed the intent of
the Reconstruction-era Congress, and that Runyon should be reaffirmed
as an important embodiment of the modem consensus against racial
discrimination.'
8
In Patterson, the Court unanimously'upheld the 1976 decision of
Runyon v. McCrary which had interpreted a Reconstruction-era civil
rights law (later codified as 42 U.S.C. section 1981) to bar private, as
well as officially sponsored, acts of racial discrimination. 19 The Patterson
decision is grounded in the notion of stare decisis, and the "fundamental
importance" of preserving a judicial system not based upon arbitrary
discretion.
2 0
By a five-to-four vote, however, the majority then placed sharp lim-
13. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 173 (seven-to-two decision).
14. In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), a black man had been de-
nied the right to buy a house in a white neighborhood on the basis ofhis race. He sued to
enforce another post-Civil War civil rights statute known as 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1964) which
provided that all persons shall have thersame right to lease, buy or convey real property as
is enjoyed by white persons. The Supreme Court held that pursuant to section 2 of the
thirteenth amendment, Congress has the power "to determine what are the badges and
the incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate that determination into effective
legislation." Id. at 440. The Court went on to hold that § 1982 and § 1981 are legitimate
exercises of that congressional authority. Id.
15. Both the district court and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that § 1981
applied to Mrs. Patterson's claims for failure to promote and discriminatory discharge, but
that § 1981 did not apply to her claims for racial harassment. Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union, 805 F.2d 1143, 1144 (4th Cir. 1986), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 109 S. Ct. 2363
(1989).
16. The Court requested that the parties submit written briefs and argue the addi-
tional question: "Whether or not the interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 adopted by this
Court in Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), should be reconsidered." Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union, 485 U.S. 617 (1988).
17. Contributors included 66 United States senators; 145 House members; 47 of the
50 state attorneys general; prominent historians; over 100 civil rights, religious, and civic
groups.
18. Taylor, Rehnquist's Court: Tuning Out the White House, N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1988
(Magazine), at 98, col. 5.
19. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2369.
20. Id. at 2370.
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its on the case's precedential value.21 In a majority opinion by Justice
Kennedy, the Court adopted an extremely narrow reading of section
1981, holding that the statute is only applicable at the initial hiring stage
and could not be used to bring a lawsuit over racially biased treatment
occurring on thejob.22 The Court reasoned that the "making" of a con-
tract23 covers only the contract's formation, and could not be construed
to reach subsequent problems arising from the conditions of continuing
employment.24 The Court also adopted a strict construction of the term
"enforcement," 25 holding that section 1981 can be invoked only when
discrimination occurs along those legal process "access routes" which
exist to resolve contract claims. 26 Under this formalistic interpretation,
Brenda Patterson's claims of racial harassment and discrimination
clearly fell outside the purview of making or enforcing her employment
contract.
In the wake of Patterson there have been over one hundred decisions
in the lower courts which have tried, with varied results, to interpret the
meaning of the case. While judges are searching for the Supreme
Court's meaning, however, there is one trend that cannot be ignored;
the courts "uniformly have rejected attempts to redress discriminatory
discharges and demotions" under section 1981.27
It should be noted that some employees whose claims have been
invalidated by the Patterson decision may be able to sue under state law.
In fact, concern about duplication of the remedial scheme of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 196428 appears to have influenced the Patterson
majority in its reluctance to read section 1981 broadly. Most employees
retain the option of suing under Title VII, a federal statute that prohib-
its race and sex discrimination in hiring, promotions, discharges and
conditions of employment.
An individual, however, who establishes a cause of action under Ti-
tle VII is entitled to a dramatically more limited remedy than under sec-
21. In the words ofJustice Brennan, "What the Court declines to snatch away with
one hand, it takes with the other." Id. at 2379 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 2372.
23. Id. at 2373.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 2772-73.
27. See Alexander v. New York Medical College, 721 F. Supp. 587, 587-88 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) ("[C]ourts construing 42 U.S.C. § 1981 since Patterson uniformly have rejected at-
tempts to redress discriminatory discharges and demotions, among other things, under
§ 1981.... [L]imiting the availability of § 1981 comports with Patterson by harmonizing the
procedures and remedies for civil rights violations within the rubric of Title VII."); see also
Leong v. Hilton Hotels Corp., No. 87-0840 (D. Haw. Apr. 24, 1989) ("It is true that the
Patterson court was not faced with the question whether a constructive discharge motivated
by racial animus is actionable under § 1981. However, the Court did hold that § 1981
only protects two rights, contract formation and contract enforcement.").
28. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982) (effective July 2, 1964). "By
reading § 1981 not as a general proscription of racial discrimination in all aspects of con-
tract relations, but as limited to the enumerated rights within its express protection, specif-
ically the right to make and enforce contracts, we may preserve the integrity of Title V1I's
procedures without sacrificing any sigificant coverage of the civil rights laws." Patterson,
109 S. Ct. at 2375.
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tion 1981. Successful Title VII plaintiffs may obtain only back pay and
affirmative job relief.29 Employees who are harassed but not forced off
the job cannot win money damages.30 In contrast, employees who sue
under section 1981 may obtain broad equitable and legal relief, includ-
ing punitive damages.3 ' Section 1981 suits are also tried before a jury,
unlike Tide VII actions which are decided by a judge.3 2 As a result of
these diminished incentives, Tide VII has been much less attractive to
plaintiffs and their lawyers than section 1981. Patterson has cut off these
section 1981 advantages from all but those plaintiffs alleging discrimina-
tion in the "making" of, or in the "enforcement" of, an employment
contract.
III. FEDERAL DisTRicT COURT OPINIONS WITHIN THE TENTH CIRcUrr
The federal district court opinions within the Tenth Circuit constru-
ing section 1981 since the Patterson decision have been sensitive to the
concerns which apparently influenced the Supreme Court majority. The
reported section 1981 cases have consistently dismissed employees' alle-
gations of post-contract harassment, including purposeful discrimina-
tory demotion. There is, however, a very definite split of opinion among
Colorado's federal judges as to the validity of section 1981 claims for
discriminatory discharge, including instances of retaliation.
A. The Discriminatory Discharge Cases
1. Padilla v. United Airlines
In Padilla v. United Airlines,33 Alan Padilla ("Padilla"), a black male,
filed a lawsuit against his former employer, United Airlines ("United"),
contending that his termination was a violation of section 1981. Padilla
had been employed as a temporary ramp serviceman with United for a
short period of time in 1985. From June 1984 to April 1986, United's
policy dictated that supervisors should terminate employees involved in
safety violations. Padilla's supervisor terminated him on April 8, 1985,
for leaving a vehicle parked in an improper area allegedly in violation of
a safety rule.
3 4
Judge Arraj entered judgment in favor of Padilla on June 14, 1989,
finding that United had discriminated against Padilla because of his race.
Specifically, the court held United responsible for terminating Padilla
29. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 495 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd on othergrounds,
424 U.S. 747 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
30. See Walker v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.2d 1355, 1363'64 (11th Cir. 1982).
31. SeeJohnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975).
32. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2391 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In addition, Title VII's stat-
ute of limitations is substantially shorter than the customary two or three year statute of
limitations applicable to § 1981 daims; § 1981 requires n'o complex administrative proce-
dures prior to suit; and § 1981 reaches conduct by any person, while Title VII covers only
employers of fifteen or more persons, labor organizations, and certain conduct by employ-
ment agencies. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), 2000e-2(a) to (c) (1982).
33. 716 F. Supp. 485 (D. Colo. 1989).
34. Padilla v. United Airlines, No. 88-A-400, slip. op. at 4 (D. Colo. June 14, 1989)
(unpublished slip opinion dealing with the merits of the case).
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without conducting an investigation aimed at determining whether he
had committed the safety violation for which he was allegedly disci-
plined.3 5 As a result of the disparate treatment undertaken by United,
the court awarded Padilla back pay in the amount of $4,117.68. This
amount constituted lost earnings for the period beginning April 19,
1985, the day after Padilla was terminated, and ending June 16, 1985,
the end of an eighty-nine day temporary employment period.
Both parties filed post-trial motions. In his first post-trial motion,
Padilla requested that the court amend its prior judgment for purposes
of determining the amount of time for which he was entitled to back pay.
Padilla argued that the defendant had the burden to prove by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that Padilla would not have been hired as a per-
manent full-time employee but for the discrimination by the
defendant.36 The court was not persuaded; instead, it found that in the
absence of any credible evidence that Padilla would have applied for a
permanent position, United was not required to prove that Padilla
would not have been hired as a permanent employee but for race
discrimination.
3 7
Padilla's second post-trial motion sought to expunge the "not eligi-
ble for rehire" notation on his employment record.3 8 The court granted
this part of Padilla's motion, holding that United must eliminate its "not
eligible for rehire" notation from Padilla's employment record.3 9 The
court reached its decision by invoking its equitable discretion in order to
remove the vestiges of past discrimination: "Where racial discrimination
is concerned, 'the [district] court has not merely the power but the duty
to render a decree which will so far as possible eliminate the discrimina-
tory effects of the past as well as bar like discrimination in the
future.' "40
United's post-trial motion was the direct result of the Supreme
Court's decision in Patterson.4 1 Citing Patterson, United contended that
section 1981 did not establish liability for termination. United re-
quested the court to amend its judgment to hold that Padilla's claims
were governed solely by Title VII and that his racial discrimination claim
should therefore have been dismissed. Alternatively, United requested
a new trial to make new findings of fact and conclusions of law that Pa-
dilla's claims were not cognizable under section 1981.
United argued that Patterson limits the application of section 1981 to
cases involving either the "formation" or the "enforcement" of the em-
ployment contract. According to United, because Padilla asserted that
his termination was based upon his race, his section 1981 claim should
35. Padilla, 716 F. Supp. at 489.
36. Id. at 486-87.
37. Id. at 487.
38. Id. at 488.
39. Id.
40. Id. (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975).
41. The Patterson opinion was announced on June 15, 1989, one day after the Padilla
court set forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law.
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have been dismissed because the incidents of allegedly discriminatory
behavior arose in the post-contract formation stages of his employment
contract.
Judge Arraj decided that the holding in Patterson did not apply to the
Padilla case. The court distinguished Patterson on the ground that the
Supreme Court "did not say that termination of an employee does not
involve the formation process" because the issue of whether Brenda Pat-
terson's claim for discriminatory firing was actionable under section
1981 was never before the Patterson Court.
4 2
In limiting the Patterson holding to a section 1981 claim for discrim-
inatory harassment, Judge Arraj reasoned that
Termination is part of the making of a contract. A person who
is terminated because of his race, like one who was denied an
employment contract because of his race, is without ajob. Ter-
mination affects the existence of the contract, not merely the
terms of its performance. Thus, discriminatory termination di-
rectly affects the right to make a contract contrary to section
1981.
4 3
The court's ratio decidendi was based almost exclusively on two
United States Court of Appeals cases, including the lower Patterson deci-
sion.4 4 The Padilla court apparently found solace in the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals rendering that "[c]laims of racially discriminatory hir-
ing, firing, and promotion go to the very existence and nature of the
employment contract and thus fall easily within section 1981's protec-
tion."14 5 Similarly, an Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision in-
volving "work environment" discrimination bolstered the Padilla court's
broad interpretation of what Patterson did not say.
46
The Padilla court also expressed its belief that Padilla's claim could
fit int the opening left by the Supreme Court's statement that discrimina-
tory conduct involving "promotions" may be actionable under section
1981 "where the promotion rises to the level of an opportunity for a
42. Padilla, 716 F. Supp. at 489 (emphasis in original). Only one other post-Patterson
opinion has held that § 1981 is applicable to actions based on discriminatory terminations.
In Birdwhistle v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 723 F. Supp. 570 (D. Kan. 1989), the plaintiff
alleged discrimination in the termination of his employment contract. The Birdwhiste
court found that Patterson did not affect the plaintiff's claim, stating that the Supreme
Court "was not asked to address, and did not address, whether alleged discriminatory
discharge is actionable under § 1981." Id. at 575. The court stated in light of Patterson,
"We believe that discharge is directly related to contract enforcement and thus is still
actionable under § 1981." Id.
43. Padilla, 716 F. Supp. at 490.
44. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 805 F.2d 1143 (4th Cir. 1986), aff'd in part,
vacated in part, 109 S.Ct. 2363 (1989).
45. Patterson, 805 F.2d at 1145.
46. The Eleventh Circuit rejected an employer's argument that racial harassment
claims were not actionable under § 1981 by stating: "We need not reach the issue of
whether § 1981 covers 'pure' harassment claims, because [the plaintiff] presented evi-
dence that the harassment caused her to stop working at Western Way, thereby impairing
her ability to make and enforce her employment contract." Vance v. Southern Bell Tel. &
Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503, 1509 n.3 (11th Cir. 1989).
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new and distinct relation between the employee and-the employer."'4 7
From this perspective, Judge Arraj reasoned that United's allegedly dis-
criminatory actions prevented Padilla from obtaining future employ-
ment with United, thereby constituting a direct barrier to his ability to
"make" a new contract.4 8 Based on the facts before the court, Judge
Arraj apparently was convinced that by terminating Padilla's temporary
employment, United abruptly ended any possible future opportunities
to contract for full-time employment.
4 9
In reaching this conclusion under the Padilla circumstances, how-
ever, Judge Arraj ignored the very fact upon which he had relied in de-
nying Padilla's first post-trial motion;5 0 that is, at no time did Padilla
ever produce any credible evidence that he would have applied for a
permanent position, and thus "make" a new contract.51 In the absence
of this evidence, it hardly seems plausible to assert that United discrimi-
nated against Padilla because of his race when United impaired his abil-
ity to make an employment contract by terminating him and by
preventing him from obtaining future employment with United. 52
The Patterson Court specifically cautioned against straining the clear
meaning of the language in section 1981. Here, Padilla neither alleged
that United discriminated against him when it entered into the employ-
ment relationship with him, nor that United impaired his ability to en-
force through legal process his established contractual rights. Padilla's
only allegation in his original complaint to support his section 1981
claim was that he was terminated. Logically, the termination of an em-
ployment "contract" comes after the employment relationship has been
established, and is therefore post-contract formation conduct of the type
no longer covered by section 1981. As it stands, Judge Arraj's opinion
reads contrary to the Patterson command.
47. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2377. It should be noted that the Supreme Court's ruling,
suggesting that allegations of discriminatory promotions may also lie outside the rubric of
§ 1981, was made even though the defendant credit union had not put the issue before the
Court.
48. Padilla v. United Airlines, 716 F. Supp. 485, 490 (D. Colo. 1989). In Luna v. City
and County of Denver, 718 F. Supp. 854 (D. Colo. 1989), another discriminatory promo-
tion case, Judge Babcock made a similar argument. In finding the claim of an Asian-Amer-
ican employee against his municipal employer to be actionable under § 1981, Judge
Babcock was persuaded by the argument that his promotion, from the position of Project
Inspector I to Engineer III, would have provided the employee with the opportunity to
"enter" into a new and distinct contractual relationship with the municipal defendants. Id.
at 856. In reaching his decisionJudge Babcock relied on the same language from Patterson
as did Judge Arraj.
49. Apparently, Judge Arraj was persuaded by the fact that the "Ineligible for Rehire"
status assigned to Padilla would effectively preclude him from entering into any future
employment with United. Padilla, 716 F. Supp. at 490 n.4.
50. See supra text accompanying note 37.
51. Judge Arraj even states that "Padilla's own self-serving testimony that he intended
to make a permanent career with United does not persuade me to the contrary." Padilla,
716 F. Supp. at 487 n.2.
52. Id. at 490.
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2. Rivera v. AT&T Information Systems, Inc.
In Rivera v. AT&T Information Systems, Inc.,53 Dorothy M. Rivera
("Rivera"), an Hispanic female, alleged that she was subjected to dispa-
rate treatment based upon her national origin when AT&T Information
Systems, Inc. ("AT&T") terminated her employment in violation of sec-
tion 1981. Rivera had been employed by AT&T in Salt Lake City, Utah,
beginning in 1973. In January of 1984, Rivera transferred to AT&T's
Denver facility. On December 22, 1986, Rivera was terminated for theft
of a base telephone set. Rivera did not dispute the actual theft; rather,
she alleged that AT&T treated non-Hispanics more favorably in in-
stances of theft, thus giving rise to her claim of disparate treatment. In
its dispositive pre-trial motion, AT&T contended that summary judg-
ment should be granted in its favor on Rivera's claim under section 1981
because her claim was barred by the Patterson decision.M
The court addressed Rivera's national origin discrimination claim
under section 1981 by construing the Patterson command in its most nar-
row circumstance. According to Judge Babcock, the first prong of the
Patterson opinion dealing with the right to "make" contracts effectively
precluded any use of section 1981 in the post-contract formation stage
where, by definition, a "termination" would occur:
55
The Supreme Court's rationale in Patterson. . . leads me to con-
clude that under the plain language of section 1981, discrimi-
natory discharge, like racial harassment amounting to a breach
of contract, is post-contract formation conduct. Discriminatory
discharge occurs after the commencement of the employment
relationship and does not affect the employee's right to make
or enforce contracts.
5 6
The Rivera court was convinced that the scope of section 1981 had
been clarified by the Supreme Court in its confirmation that the right to
make contracts "extends only to the formation of a contract, but not to
problems that may arise later from the conditions of continuing employ-
ment."' 5 7 The rationale in the Rivera decision is in accord with the
53. 719 F. Supp. 962 (D. Colo. 1989).
54. AT&T argued for summary judgement claiming that Rivera's state law breach of
contract claim was preempted by the Labor-Management Relations Act § 301, 29 U.S.C.
§ 185 (1982). On this issue, Judge-Babcock decided that Rivera was entitled to more dis-
covery as to whether her claims against AT&T existed outside of the collective bargaining
agreement. Rivera, 719 F. Supp. at 965.
55. Apparently, Judge Babcock's position is the majority one. See Busch v. Pizza Hut,
Inc., No. 88-C-8241 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 2, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) ("Although
Patterson did not directly address the question whether constructive discharge claims are
still actionable under § 1981, given the narrow scope of the statute defined in Patterson, it
appears that constructive discharge claims are similarly excluded from § 1981's cover-
age."); Bush v. Union Bank, No. 88-0252-CV-W-9 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 12, 1989) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file) ("Although racial harassment and failure to promote, not termi-
nation, were involved in Patterson; the Supreme Court's explanation of its ruling furnishes
guidance in determining whether plaintiff has stated a claim under § 1981.... [P]laintiff's
claim that she was discriminated against on the basis of her race because she was dis-
charged [does not] involve the rights to make or to enforce contracts.").
56. Rivera, 719 F. Supp. at 965.
57. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2372.
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Supreme Court's command that the "right to make contracts does not
extend, as a matter of either logic or semantics, to conduct by the em-
ployer after the contract relation has been established, including breach
of the terms of the contract or imposition of discriminatory working
conditions."' 58 Under this analysis, and because Rivera did not allege
that AT&T discriminated against her when it entered into their employ-
ment relationship, it was not difficult for Judge Babcock to find that Ri-
vera's alleged discriminatory discharge claim was not actionable under
section 1981.5
9
What is most intriguing about Judge Babcock's decision is its dia-
metric opposition to the stance taken by Judge Arraj in Padilla.60
Although Judge Babcock agreed with Judge Arraj's assertion that the
Patterson Court never specifically addressed the issue of discriminatory
discharge, he concluded that the express language of Patterson and the
clear implication of its holding bar a Padilla-like holding:
[R]acial harassment amounting to breach of contract, like racial
harassment alone, impairs neither the right to make nor the
right to enforce a contract. It is plain that the former right is
not implicated directly by an employer's breach in the perform-
ance of obligations under a contract already formed. Nor is it
correct to say that racial harassment amounting to a breach of
contract impairs an employee's right to enforce his contract.
To the contrary, conduct amounting to a breach of contract
under state law is precisely what the language of section 1981
does not cover. That is because, in such a case, provided that
plaintiff's access to state court or any other dispute resolution
process has not been impaired by either the State or a private
actor.... the plaintiff is free to enforce the terms of the con-
tract in state court, and cannot possibly assert, by reason of the
breach alone, that he has been deprived of the same right to
enforce contracts as is enjoyed by white citizens. 6 1
Accordingly, Judge Arraj's assertion that "termination" is part of
the "making of a contract" had no place in Judge Babcock's formalistic
section 1981 analysis. In fact,Judge Babcock's view represents the over-
whelming majority of post-Patterson opinions addressing this issue.
62
58. Id. at 2372-73.
59. It should be noted that Rivera still retained her rights under Title VII. As such,
and because the Patterson decision was announced nearly six months after Rivera filed her
original complaint, Judge Babcock granted her leave to file an amended complaint to as-
sert a claim for relief under Title VII.
60. Apparently, Judge Babcock is not alone in his criticism of the Padilla decision. In
Hall v. County of Cook, 719 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Ill. 1989), Judge Rovner stated: "After
careful consideration of the Supreme Court's opinion in Patterson, this Court has deter-
mined that it must respectfully disagree with the Colorado court. If there were any indica-
tion that the right to make a contract under § 1981 should be construed broadly as the
right to enjoy the benefits of that contract, the Colorado court would no doubt be correct
in its reasoning. But the Court in Patterson did not interpret the right to make a contract
under § 1981 in this manner." Id. at 723.
61. Rivera v. AT&T Information Sys., 719 F. Supp. 962, 964-65 (D. Colo. 1989)
(quoting Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2376).
62. See Singleton v. Kellogg Co., No. 89-1073 (6th Cir. Nov. 29, 1989) (The court, in
affirming the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's § 1981 claim, noted that the plaintiff
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Under the majority view, once an individual has sectired employment,
the protection of section 1981 ceases. With respect to conduct that oc-
curs after the formation of the contract, including discharge, the em-
ployee must look to the remedial scheme of Title VII for protection. As
such, it would appear that Rivera is the properly decided decision, in that
a plaintiff's claim of racially discriminatory discharge is no longer ac-
tionable under section 1981.
B. Retaliatory Discharge: Jordan v. U.S. West Direct Co.
The second protection referenced under section 1981 prohibits dis-
crimination in the legal process that prevents the enforcement of estab-
lished contract rights. In Jordan v. U.S. West Direct Co.,63 Judge Carrigan
wrestled with the issue of whether a retaliatory discharge claim could
still fall within the rubric of section 1981 protection, notwithstanding
the Patterson Court's determination that section 1981, by its plain terms,
can only protect the narrow right "to make contracts" and "to enforce
contracts."
In Jordan, Timothy Jordan ("Jordan") filed a lawsuit against his for-
mer employer, U.S. West Direct Company ("U.S. West"), alleging work-
place harassment and retaliatory discrimination under Title VII and
section 1981. U.S. West submitted two motions to dismiss, contending
in the first that Jordan's Title VII claim asserting retaliatory demotion
could not survive because he had failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies. In response, Jordan asserted that he was retaliated against
because he spoke out against discrimination and instigated an internal
investigation of U.S. West. According to Jordan, his "Discrimination
Statement" filed with the Colorado Civil Rights Commission set forth
sufficient information to indicate that the internal Equal Employment
Opportunity investigator' intentionally misrepresented Jordan and
others in her investigation ofJordan's discrimination charges.
The court was not convinced that Jordan's failure to exhaust his
administrative remedies with the Colorado Civil Rights Commission ne-
did not contend that the alleged discriminatory discharge involved impairment of her right
to "make" or "enforce" contracts. It stated that, in light of Patterson, plaintiff's claim of
racially discriminatory discharge is no longer cognizable under § 1981.); see also Thompson
v. Johnson &Johnson Mgmt. Infor. Ctr., 725 F. Supp. 826 (D.NJ. 1989); International
City Mgmt. Ass'n Retirement Corp. v. Watkins, 726 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1989); Guerrero v.
Preston Trucking Co., No. 87-C-3036 (N.D. Ill. Dec.21, 1989); Crader v. Concordia Col-
lege, 724 F. Supp. 558 (N.D. Ill. 1989); James v. Dropsie College, No. 89-4429 (E.D. Pa.
Nov. 22, 1989); Dumas v. Phillips College of New Orleans, Inc., No. 89-0526 (E.D. La.
Nov. 21, 1989); Owens v. Foot Locker, No. 88-8279 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 15, 1989); Matthews v.
Northern Telecom, Inc., No. 88-0583 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 1989); Eklofv. Bramalea Ltd., No.
89-5312 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 27, 1989); Carroll v. Geneial Motors Corp., No. 88-2532-0 (D. Kan.
Oct. 27, 1989); Williams v. Edsal Mfg. Co., No. 88-C-10341 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 25, 1989);
Brown v. Avon Products, Inc., No. 88-C-4459 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 4, 1989); Gonzalez v. National
R.R. Passenger Corp., No. 87-2264 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 1989);Jones v. Alltech Assoc., Inc.,
No. 85-C-10345 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 5, 1989); Copperidge v. Terminal Freight Handling Co.,
No. 89-2198 (W.D. Tenn. July 27, 1989); Jackson v. Commonwealth Edison, No., 87-C-
4449 (N.D. Ill. July 6, 1989).
63. 716 F. Supp. 1366 (D. Colo. 1989).
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cessitated dismissal of the Title VII claim. The court reasoned that be-
cause the two related charges of discrimination and retaliation were so
closely intertwined, the failure to exhaust the discrimination charge was
not fatal to Jordan's proceeding with his federal court retaliation charge.
In its second motion, U.S. West contended that Patterson precluded
Jordan's utilization of section 1981 as a means to address allegedly dis-
criminatory conduct which occurred after the formation of his contract
and which did not interfere with his right to enforce the contractual obli-
gations. Specifically, U.S. West sought to use Patterson to dismiss two of
Jordan's claims: his claim of purposeful discrimination arising from his
demotion to a nonmanagerial position on February 16, 1987, and his
assertion of retaliatory demotion.
Judge Carrigan held in U.S. West's favor with regard to Jordan's
allegations of harassment, including the purposeful discriminatory de-
motion claim. In dismissing this claim, the court distinguished Jordan's
situation from those instances alluded to in Patterson in which a failure to
promote might rise to an actionable level of discriminatory conduct
under section 1981. In considering Jordan's situation, the court rea-
soned that because this was a case of a "wrongful demotion, as opposed
to a failure to promote, there is no refusal by the employer to enter into
a new contract with the employee. Wrongful demotion allegations thus
are included in racial harassment at the workplace." 64 As such, Jordan's
discriminatory demotion claim clearly fell outside the purview of the
"making" or "formation" of the employment contract.
With regard to U.S. West's motion to dismissJordan's allegations of
retaliatory discrimination, Judge Carrigan was not convinced that Patter-
son mandated preclusion. In Patterson, the majority declared:
The second of these guarantees, "the same right . . . to ...
enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citizens," embraces
protection of a legal process, that will address and resolve con-
tract law claims without regard to race. In this respect, it pro-
hibits discrimination that infects the legal process in ways that
prevent one from enforcing contract rights, by reason of his or
her race .... 65
In concluding that Jordan's retaliation charges fell within the cover-
age afforded by the right to "enforce" contracts contained in section
1981, Judge Carrigan reasoned that:
The right to enforce contracts extends to private efforts to obstruct
nonjudicial methods of adjudicating disputes involving discrim-
ination. Plaintiff alleges that he was retaliated against because
he complained of discrimination and instigated an investigation
regarding his charges. These allegations fall within the cover-
age afforded by the right to enforce contracts contained in sec-
tion 1981.66
64. Id. at 1368.
65. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2373.
66. Jordan, 716 F. Supp. at 1368-69 (emphasis in original).
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Judge Carrigan's decision represents a minority view among the
federal courts thai have addressed the issue of retaliatory discharge.
67
For instance, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that a plaintiff's
retaliatory discharge claim was post-formation conduct not actionable
under section 1981.68 The Ninth Circuit explained that the plaintiff's
right to make a contract Was not implicated, nor did he allege that the
defendant obstructed his access to courts or to any other dispute resolu-
tion process. 69 Most of the other courts dealing with the retaliatory dis-
charge issue have found that, because such behavior is specifically
proscribed by section 704(a) of Title VII,7 it is unnecessary "to twist
the interpretation of another statute (section 1981) to cover the same
conduct."
'7 1
Apparently, Judge Carrigan was not convinced that such a pinched
view of Patterson was required under the particular circumstances ofJor-
dan's discharge.72 Instead, Judge Carrigan interpreted U.S. West's con-
duct as a direct effort to "impede" Jordan's right to enforce his contract
in violation of section 1981. This interpretation is consistent with Patter-
son if section 1981 is construed not as an absolute proscription of dis-
crimination in all instances of retaliation, but rather to include only
those forms of direct obstructive behavior that discriminate against an
employee's right to enforce a contract. 73
IV. CONCLUSION
The confusion surrounding the Patterson case, in which the Supreme
Court held that federal law prohibiting racial discrimination in private
contracts does not apply to "conduct which occurs after the formation of
a contract," is readily apparent in Colorado's Tenth Circuit. Based on
67. A partial list of recent cases that have construed Patterson to preclude § 1981
claims for retaliatory discharge includes Alexander v. New York Medical College, 721 F.
Supp. 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Williams v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 716 F. Supp. 49
(D.D.C. 1989); Mathis v. Boeing Military Airplane Co., 719 F. Supp. 991 (D. Kan. 1989);
Kolb v. Ohio, 721 F. Supp. 885 (N.D. Ohio 1989). For a case supportingJudge Carrigan's
view see English v. General Dev. Corp., 717 F. Supp. 628 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
68. Overby v. Chevron USA, Inc., 884 F.2d 470 (9th Cir. 1989).
69. Id. at 473.
70. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1982).
71. Overby, 884 F.2d at 473 (quoting Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2375).
72. However, in another case whose fact pattern did not involve conduct directly in-
fringing on a plaintiff's right to "enforce" an employment contract, Judge Carrigan
granted summary judgment for defendants on a § 1981 claim because the plaintiff had
asserted the claim as a result of being fired. "While it might be argued that the § 1981
right to non-discriminatory procedures to 'enforce' a contract is hollow if there is no §
1981 protection against termination of the contract because of ethnicity or race, the
Supreme Court's rationale is inconsistent with such reasoning. Because employment ter-
mination dearly constitutes post-formation conduct not impinging on procedures to enforce the
contract, the plaintiff's claim cannot stand post-Patterson." Trujillo v. Grand Junction Re-
gional Center, No. 88-C-1423, slip op. at 7 (D. Colo. 1990) (emphasis in original).
73. It should be noted, however, thatJudge Carrigan invited the parties to bring to his
attention any pertinent case authority that would shed light on his Patterson interpretation:
"I would not look with disfavor on either party asking for reconsideration as long as that
request is supported by pertinent case law." Jordan v. U.S. West Direct Co., 716 F. Supp.
1366, 1369 (D. Colo. 1989).
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the facts in Padilla, it appears thatJudge Arraj misconstrued the Patterson
command when he found that discriminatory discharge is directly re-
lated to contract formation, thus falling within the rubric of section 1981
protection. In all likelihood, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals will
follow other recent opinions, including Judge Babcock's decision in Ri-
vera, and will overturn the Padilla decision. 74 The clear weight of post-
Patterson authority holds that an employee's claim of discriminatory ter-
mination in violation of section 1981 is no longer actionable.
Conversely, Judge Carrigan's holding in Jordan that a section 1981
retaliatory discrimination claim can stand post-Patterson appears to be
correctly decided based on the narrow circumstances of the case. That
is, when retaliation clearly impinges on an employee's ability to enforce
the employment contract, then section 1981 can still be utilized.
Decisions such as Padilla andJordan are indicative of the difficulties
confronting the lower federal courts which are caught in the ground
swell of criticism surrounding the Patterson decision. Even Justice Ken-
nedy was sensitive to the impending fire storm of debate, writing at the
end of his opinion in the Patterson case: "Neither our words nor our
decisions should be interpreted as signaling one inch of retreat from
Congress' policy to forbid discrimination."' 75 From some perspectives,
Justice Kennedy's remarks were merely a restatement of the obvious.
Others, hearing a defensive tone in Justice Kennedy's words, prepared
to brave the treacherous and shifting shoals of post-Patterson employ-
ment discrimination law, to hold Congress, if not the Court, to its
promise.
Harvey L. Cohen
74. In the only post-Patterson decision issued by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals,
Judge Ebel decided that the district court properly dismissed the plaintiff's claim under
§ 1981. In reaching that decision, the court stated that "[s]ection 1981's contract clause
protects only the right to enter into and enforce contracts." Phelps v. Wichita Eagle-Bea-
con, 886 F.2d 1262, 1267 (10th Cir. 1989) (citing Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109
S. Ct. 2363 (1989)). While this decision is not dispositive of the issues on appeal in Padilla,
it appears to be a harbinger of things to come.
75. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2379.
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